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It is often proposed that the unacceptability of a semantically interpretable
sentence can be rooted in its meaning. Elaborating on Oshima (2007), we argue
that the meaning-driven unacceptability of factive islands must make reference
to felicity conditions, and cannot be reduced to the triviality of propositional
content. We also observe, again elaborating on Oshima, that the triviality of
factive islands need not be logical, but can be relative to a listener’s back-
ground assumptions. These findings call for a revision of a prevalent view
about meaning-driven unacceptability, according to which unacceptability re-
sults from triviality that is both propositional and logical.
Keywords: factive islands, questions, unacceptability, triviality, felicity conditions,
presuppositions, uniqueness
1 Introduction
Under a widely adopted view, the unacceptability of a semantically interpretable
sentence can be rooted in its meaning. The phenomena that have been referred to in
motivating this view include, for example, the definiteness effect in existential there-
sentences (Barwise and Cooper 1981), aspectual modification (Dowty 1979), exceptive
phrases (von Fintel 1993), polarity sensitivity (Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998, Chierchia
2013), and comparative clauses (Gajewski 2009). The precise characterization of
the meaning-driven unacceptability that these phenomena are taken to instantiate
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is a matter of current debate. But extant proposals seem to assume that meaning-
driven unacceptability arises, under certain conditions, in virtue of a sentence having
tautologous or contradictory truth conditions or in virtue of it carrying a contradictory
presupposition (Gajewski 2002, Chierchia 2013, Abrusa´n 2014, Del Pinal 2017). In the
following, we will refer to this proposal by saying that meaning-driven unacceptability
is assumed to arise, under certain conditions, when a sentence carries logically trivial
propositional content.
To illustrate, consider an instance of the familiar definiteness effect, viz. the fact
that existential there-sentences do not permit a universal quantifier in post-verbal
position. Barwise and Cooper (1981) derive the unacceptability of such cases from the
assumption that they have tautologous truth conditions. On this view, sentence (1)
is unacceptable in virtue of asserting nothing more than the tautologous proposition
that every student in the domain is a member of the domain.
(1) *There is every student.
It can be argued that sentences that carry logically trivial propositional content
in the sense introduced above are guaranteed to violate certain felicity conditions.
Stalnaker (1978) proposed the principle that a sentence must be true in some but
not all possible worlds in the context set, i.e. the set of possible worlds that encodes
the information entailed by the common ground, and also that a sentence must have
a truth value in each world in the context set. Tautologies and contradictions nec-
essarily violate the first of these conditions; and under the Frege/Strawson notion
of semantic presupposition, where presupposition failure amounts to a lack of truth
value, sentences that carry contradictory presuppositions necessarily violate the sec-
ond.
Necessary infelicity can therefore serve as a natural underlying pragmatic rationale
for the proposal that logically trivial propositional content leads to unacceptability.
However, this rationale leads one to expect that meaning-driven unacceptability need
not be tied to logically trivial propositional content. This is so because necessary
infelicity might arise in a broader range of circumstances. We can illustrate this
possibility by considering an alternative analysis of the definiteness effect, due to
Zucchi (1995). (Note that here we appeal to the definiteness effect merely to illustrate
analytical options, without taking a stand on its proper analysis.) Under Zucchi’s
analysis, the unacceptability of (1) springs from the conspiracy of a pair of felicity
conditions. On the one hand, a felicity condition on the use of existential there-
sentences is taken to require for (1) that the context set be compatible with the set
of students being empty; on the other hand, felicitous use of every student is taken to
require that the context set entail the set of students to be non-empty. Hence the two
felicity conditions make conflicting demands. This conflict, which does not invoke
contradictory propositional content, ensures that (1) is necessarily infelicitous, and
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it is this necessary infelicity that Zucchi holds responsible for the unacceptability of
cases like (1).
In this paper, we will offer an argument that meaning-driven unacceptability can-
not be reduced to the logical triviality of propositional content. We will argue that,
as implied by Zucchi’s (1995) analysis of the definiteness effect, the triviality that
causes unacceptability need not be propositional. We will motivate these claims as
consequences of the proper analysis of factive islands. In factive islands, question-
forming wh-extraction from the complement of a factive predicate yields unaccept-
ability (Rooryck 1992; Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993; Oshima 2007; Abrusa´n 2011, 2014;
Del Pinal 2017). The effect is illustrated by the unacceptability of Oshima’s (2007)
example (2), in a reading where how is understood as associating with the embedded
clause.
(2) *?How does Max know that Alice went to San Francisco?
We will argue for an analysis of factive islands originating in Oshima (2007), on which
the content of such questions ensures, in the absence of trivial propositional content,
that two felicity conditions make conflicting demands, much as in Zucchi’s (1995)
analysis of the definiteness effect. We moreover argue that this conflict need not be
a matter of logical contradiction, but can be dependent on a listener’s background
assumptions. On this analysis, then, factive islands teach us that the triviality un-
derlying meaning-driven unacceptability does not have to be either propositional or
logical.
We will conclude that, while factive islands lend support to the view that it is
a certain triviality of meaning that underlies meaning-driven unacceptability, they
are incompatible with existing attempts of fleshing out the idea (Gajewski 2002,
Chierchia 2013, Abrusa´n 2014, Del Pinal 2017). We therefore intend our contribution
as an invitation to reexamine the arguments that have motivated these attempts –
an invitation that we hope will be taken up in future work.
Section 2 provides a more detailed introduction to the phenomenon of factive is-
lands. Focusing on who-questions, section 3 then introduces a preliminary version
of the proposed account of factive islands, a rendition of Oshima’s (2007) analysis,
which credits factive islandhood to necessary, non-propositional infelicity due to con-
spiring felicity conditions. Section 4 presents independent motivation for this analysis,
emerging from Simonenko’s (2016) treatment of a similar island effect. Section 5 cri-
tiques an alternative approach, due to Abrusa´n (2011, 2014) and adopted in Del Pinal
(2017), on which factive islandhood arises from a contradictory universally projected
presupposition. Section 6 points out that the triviality that causes unacceptability in
factive islands need not be logical triviality, and it speculates on the possible conse-
quences of this finding. Section 7 argues that the proposed analysis applies correctly




The factivity of a clause-embedding predicate in certain cases prevents question-
forming wh-movement from the predicate’s clausal complement (Rooryck 1992; Sz-
abolcsi and Zwarts 1993; Oshima 2007; Abrusa´n 2011, 2014). In particular, how and
why typically cannot extract from the complement of a factive predicate. For fac-
tive know, this factive island effect is illustrated by the unacceptability of Oshima’s
(2007) examples (3a) (which repeats (2)) and (4b), in readings where how or why is
understood as originating in the embedded clause. Replacing know with non-factive
think, as in (4), renders these cases acceptable (in the relevant readings), confirming
the role of factivity as an ingredient of the island effect.
(3) a. *?How does Max know that Alice went to San Francisco?
b. *Why does Max know that Alice insulted Pat?
(4) a. How does Max think that Alice went to San Francisco?
b. Why does Max think that Alice insulted Pat?
In contrast to how - and why-questions, wh-extraction in who-questions is not
typically affected by factivity. This is illustrated by (5), from Szabolcsi and Zwarts
(1993), where who successfully extracts from the complement of factive regret.1
(5) To whom do you regret having shown this letter?
What is the nature of the factive island effect? Is it due to the violation of syntactic
constraints or is it rooted in the meaning? Critical evidence comes from Szabolcsi and
Zwarts’ (1993) discovery of unacceptable examples like (6a), which modifies (5) by
substituting gotten this letter (from) for shown this letter (to). The contrast between
(6a) and (6b), where non-factive suspect replaces the factive predicate, shows that
wh-extraction in who-questions, too, can be precluded by factivity.
(6) a. *From whom do you regret having gotten this letter?
b. From whom do you suspect having gotten this letter?
The acceptability contrast between (5) and (6a) suggests that factive islandhood is
sensitive to the semantic content of the embedded clause, and that appeal to syntactic
constraints is at least insufficient. Specifically, Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) propose
that factive islandhood materializes with who when the embedded clause describes
a non-iterable event. That is, they suggest that the contrast between (5) and (6a)
1We use “who-question” as a cover term for all questions that ask for individuals; these all behave
alike with regard to factive islands. Apart from question with who, they also include questions with
which, what, and where.
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reflects the fact that, while an event of showing someone this letter is iterable, the
event of getting this letter is not.
The data pattern illustrated above, as interpreted by Szabolcsi and Zwarts, raises
obvious questions. Why would non-iterability conspire with factivity to preempt
extraction of who-phrases? And what is the general notion of ill-formedness that
links superficially dissimilar instances of the factive island effect like those in (3) and
(6a)?
Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) themselves proposed that the underlying cause of
factive islandhood is a failure of semantic composition, and that the above contrasts
are rooted in a semantic type distinction. Their contribution is groundbreaking in
virtue of establishing that factive islandhood is (at least in part) a matter of meaning
and proposing a coherent rationale for linking superficially diverse instances of the
phenomenon. However, the account has a number of shortcomings, catalogued in
Oshima (2007) and Abrusa´n (2011, 2014) – most prominently, in our view, a shortage
of independent support for the proposed type distinction and its assumed effect on
semantic composition.
Oshima (2007) sketched an alternative account of factive islandhood, as what we
call meaning-driven unacceptability, that we consider more promising. According to
Oshima’s analysis, rather than pointing to a failure of semantic composition, factive
islandhood is rooted in necessary infelicity. On this account, or rather the rendition
that we will spell out below, factive islandhood is due to a conspiracy of two felicity
conditions. Due to their semantic makeup, factive island questions cannot satisfy
either of these conditions without violating the other. This analysis, which we dub
the conspiracy analysis, is introduced in Section 3.
3 Factive islands from non-propositional triviality
Before introducing the theoretical ingredients of the conspiracy analysis in Section
3.2, we first identify in Section 3.1 an assumption underlying that analysis, regarding
a characteristic semantic property, or logical signature, of factive islands.
3.1 The logical signature of factive islands
As reported above, Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) discovered that factive islandhood
can materialize with who-questions, viz. when the embedded clause describes a non-
iterable event, as in (6a), repeated here as (7).
(7) *From whom do you regret having gotten this letter?
Oshima (2007) interprets data like (7) as showing that factive islands arise when the
property given by the factive predicate’s complement clause applies uniquely, that is,
cannot hold of more than one entity. On this view, the unacceptability of (7) depends
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on the uniqueness of the letter’s sender, that is, the fact that the property of having
sent the letter cannot hold of more than on individual. As further support for this
generalization, we present the example in (8).
(8) *Which of the girls does Fred know is the tallest member of our team?
Since only one individual can be the tallest member of our team, in this case the
property described by the gapped complement clause again applies uniquely. As
expected under Oshima’s interpretation, (8) is judged unacceptable in much the way
as (7) is.
Oshima further proposes that in factive island questions with how and why, the
property described by the gapped complement applies uniquely as well. For the
factive island examples in (3), repeated here in (9), the claim is that there can be
only one manner that provides a true answer to the question how Alice went to San
Francisco, and that there can be only one reason that provides a true answer to the
question why Alice insulted Pat.
(9) a. *?How does Max know that Alice went to San Francisco?
b. *Why does Max know that Alice insulted Pat?
We will scrutinize these assumptions about how - and why-questions (and also
degree questions) in Section 7 (see also footnote 6). For the moment, we will simply
accept Oshima’s characterization of the logical signature of factive islands. That is,
we will assume that factive islandhood is dependent on the factive predicate’s gapped
complement describing a property that applies uniquely. It is this assumption that
underlies Oshima’s conspiracy analysis, to which we now turn.
3.2 Factive islands and necessary infelicity
To facilitate the introduction of the conspiracy analysis, we first outline the semantics
of questions that it builds on.
3.2.1 Question semantics
The conspiracy analysis of factive islandhood assumes the so-called Hamblin/Kart-
tunen semantics for wh-questions (Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977). Under this se-
mantics, a question extension is a set of propositions. This set can be thought of
as a family of possible answers to the question, the so-called Hamblin answers. For
example, the extension of (10) contains, for any member x, the proposition that x
resigned.
(10) Which member resigned?
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We will be exclusively concerned with wh-questions of the form instantiated by this
example, that is, examples of the form [wh R] S, where wh is the lone wh-word,
the predicate R is the wh-word’s property-denoting restrictor, [wh R] is the wh-
phrase, and the predicate S is the wh-phrase’s property-denoting scope. We construe
propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth values, and properties as
functions from individuals to propositions. We take the denotation of a question to
be its intension, a function that maps any possible world to the extension of the
question in that world. So the question [wh R] S denotes the function in (11), where
R and S are the denotations of R and S, respectively. The values of R and S in the
example in (10) are given in (12).
(11) Hamblin/Karttunen semantics:
λw.{S(x)| R(x)(w)}
(12) R = λx.λw. x is a member in w
S = λx.λw. x resigned in w
We take propositions to be partial functions, i.e. functions whose domain may
comprise only those possible worlds that meet certain conditions. Under the Frege/
Strawson notion of semantic presupposition, adopted here for concreteness, this pro-
vides a way of encoding the presuppositional content contributed by a presupposition
trigger in the scope of the wh-phrase. To illustrate, if we take gender marking to
trigger a presupposition (Cooper 1983), the property denoted by nominated herself
will map any individual to a proposition whose domain is limited to worlds where
that individual is female. To simplify reference to presuppositional content, let P be
a property such that for any individual x, P(x) characterizes the domain of S(x). So,
if S is the property denoted by nominated herself, then P is the property of being
female. For the question in (13), the values for R, P, S are then as given in (14).
(To make partiality explicit, we employ the colon notation introduced in Heim and
Kratzer 1998.) With reference to R, P, and S, we can rewrite the Hamblin/Karttunen
denotation (11) as in (15).
(13) Which member nominated herself?
(14) R = λx.λw. x is a member in w
P = λx.λw. x is female in w
S = λx.λw: x is female in w. x nominated herself in w
(15) Hamblin/Karttunen semantics:
λw.{λv: P(x)(v). S(x)(v)| R(x)(w)}
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We note that in the absence of a presupposition trigger in the wh-phrase’s scope,
P is the trivial property – the property that applies to every individual in every
possible world. The garden variety question in (10) is a case in point. In (16), the
list of values given in (12) above is updated accordingly.
(16) R = λx.λw. x is a member in w
P = λx.λw. w = w
S = λx.λw. x resigned in w
We now turn to introducing the conspiracy analysis. While we attribute it to
Oshima (2007), we should note that Oshima’s exposition is very brief. Our presen-
tation of the conspiracy analysis is considerably more detailed and superficially very
different from Oshima’s.
3.2.2 Answerability and existence
As announced earlier, the conspiracy analysis attributes factive islandhood to nec-
essary infelicity. Necessary infelicity is taken to arise from a conspiracy of felicity
conditions on question use, which factive island questions cannot satisfy simultane-
ously.
We construe felicity conditions as restricting the permissible relations between
context sets and possible sentence denotations. We assume Stalnaker’s (1978) notion
of context set as a set of possible worlds that encodes the information entailed by
the common ground. Felicity conditions on questions, then, relate context sets to
possible Hamblin/Karttunen question denotations.
The first felicity condition on questions that we introduce here is what we will
refer to as the answerability condition. (We read Oshima 2007 as assuming such a
condition, even though his exposition does not state it explicitly.) The answerability
condition defines the felicity of a Hamblin/Karttunen denotation in terms of felicity
conditions on the Hamblin answers that this denotation determines. For any possible
sentence denotation X and context set c, we write cX to indicate that X is felicitous
relative to c. Employing this notation, we state the answerability condition as in (17)
(which generalizes a condition also stated informally in Guerzoni 2003).
(17) Answerability condition (preliminary):
cQ only if ∃p[ ∃w[w∈c & p∈Q(w)] & cp ]
The answerability condition states that a question denotation is felicitous relative to
a context set only if there is a context set world where the question extension contains
a proposition that is felicitous relative to the context set. In a nutshell, the condition
requires that the context set be consistent with the question having a felicitous answer.
The answerability condition, then, amounts to a test for the existence of a possible
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felicitous answer in an idealized question-answer dialogue where the possible answers
are those enshrined in the Hamblin/Karttunen denotation.
Note that the question extension may in principle vary from one context set world
to another. The answerability condition must therefore specify in what, or how many,
context set worlds a felicitous answer is required to be a member of the question
extension. According to (17), there must be a felicitous answer that is in the question
extension in at least one context set world.2
In order to actually apply the answerability condition, it is necessary to first give
content to the conjunct cp, so as to establish the felicity conditions that Hamblin an-
swers are subject to. Here we will assume two relevant constraints on the  relation.
These constraints are adaptations of two conditions on assertions proposed in Stal-
naker (1978). Linking semantic and pragmatic notions of presupposition, Stalnaker
proposed that in felicitous discourse, a semantic presupposition encoded as a partial
proposition’s domain must be entailed by the context set. This condition, which von
Fintel (2008) dubbed Stalnaker’s Bridge, is stated in (18). As well, Stalnaker posited
that the proposition expressed by a felicitous assertion must be informative in the
context set; that is, there must be a context set world where the assertion is false.
Our version of this condition – we call it the informativity condition – is stated in
(19).
(18) Stalnaker’s Bridge:
cp only if c⊆dom(p)
(19) Informativity condition:
cp only if c*p
Putting everything together, the preliminary rendition of the answerability condition
in (17) can then be expanded as in (20). In a nutshell, the condition states that for a
question to be felicitous, the context set must be consistent with the question having
an informative answer whose presupposition is met.
(20) Answerability condition (expanded):
cQ only if ∃p[ ∃w[w∈c & p∈Q(w)] & c⊆dom(p) & c*p ]
Returning now to factive islands, we attend to our example (8), repeated in (21).
The values that the properties R, P, and S take on in this example are listed in
2Here we elaborate on both Guerzoni (2003) and Oshima (2007), who do not actually consider
the possibility of the question extension varying from one context set world to another. Note that a
conceivable alternative rendition of the condition would impose the stronger requirement that there
must be a felicitous answer that is in the question extension in all context set worlds. However, we
will make do with the weaker version in (17), as it is sufficient for the specific purpose of analyzing
factive islands.
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(22). What sets factive island cases like (21) apart from acceptable examples like
(13) (Which member nominated herself? ) is uniqueness. In the present format, the
fact that the embedding predicate is factive, plus the fact that its gapped complement
denotes uniquely, guarantees that P relates to the context set as shown in (23).
(21) *Which of the girls does Fred know is the tallest member of our team?
(22) R = λx.λw. x is one of the girls in w
P = λx.λw. x is the tallest member of our team in w
S = λx.λw: x is the tallest member of our team in w. Fred knows in w that
x is the tallest member of our team
(23) Factivity plus uniqueness:
c ⊆ {w: |{x: P(x)(w)}| ≤ 1}
According to (23), the context set entails that P holds of at most one individual.
For the case of (21), this amounts to the context set having the entailment that
there is at most one girl that is the tallest member of our team. Note that, under
the Hamblin/Karttunen semantics in (15), factivity plus uniqueness ensures that in
every context set world, there is at most one proposition in the question extension
whose presupposition is true. That is, (23) has the consequence in (24).
(24) Consequence of factivity plus uniqueness:
c ⊆ {w: |{p: p∈Q(w) & w∈dom(p)}| ≤ 1}
The observation at the heart of the conspiracy analysis is that given factivity plus
uniqueness, the answerability condition is in conflict with another felicity condition on
questions. According to a prevalent intuition, a wh-question carries the presupposi-
tion that there is an individual who has both the restrictor and scope properties (e.g.,
Dayal 1996, Fox and Hackl 2006, Abusch 2010). For example, the question in (10)
(Which member resigned? ) is taken to presuppose that some member resigned, and
(13) (Which member nominated herself? ) is taken to presuppose that some member
is female and nominated herself. Under the Hamblin/Karttunen semantics, we can
say that a question presupposes that at least one of the Hamblin answers is true.
Without encoding this existence presupposition in the denotation of the question, we
propose the felicity condition in (25) so as to directly describe its pragmatic effect (of
requiring that in every context set world, the question extension contains a Hamblin
answer that is true in that world).
(25) Existence presupposition:
cQ only if c ⊆ {w: ∃p[p∈Q(w) & p(w)]}
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It can be shown that under the Hamblin/Karttunen semantics, assuming fac-
tivity plus uniqueness, the answerability condition and the existence presupposition
are inconsistent; that is, there are no logically possible context sets that meet both
conditions.
Before establishing the general result, it might be useful to consider a pair of toy
context sets that illustrate the conflict between the answerability condition and the
existence presupposition, given factivity plus uniqueness. To aid this illustration, we
introduce a bit of convenient notation. For any sets X, Y, Z, and given a question
denotation defined by properties R, P, and S, let wR:X,P:Y,S:Z be some possible world
w such that {x: R(x)(w)} = X, {x: P(x)(w)} = Y, and {x: S(x)(w)} = Z. Consider
now the toy context sets in (26) and (27) (where a and b are individuals).
(26) a. c =
{
wR:{a, b}, P:{a}, S:{a}








wR:{a, b}, P:{a}, S:∅
wR:{a, b}, P:{a}, S:{a}
}
Both context sets in (26) respect factivity plus uniqueness, as both entail that only
one individual (a or b) has property P. Also, both context sets meet the existence
presupposition, since the three sets determined by R, P, and S overlap in every
context set world (with a or b as a common member). However, neither context set
in (26) meets the answerability condition. In (26a), this is because the context set
does not entail any individual to have the property P, hence it fails to entail the
presupposition of any Hamblin answer. The context set in (26b) entails that P(a),
so it meets the presupposition of the Hamblin answer S(a); however, the context set
also entails S(a) itself, so that this Hamblin answer is not informative relative to the
context set.
In contrast, the context set in (27), which also respects factivity plus uniqueness,
meets the answerability condition, since it entails P(a) without also entailing the
proposition S(a). However, this context set does not meet the existence presupposi-
tion, since in one of the context set worlds the set determined by S is empty, which
entails that the sets determined by R, P, and S fail to overlap.
We now turn to establishing the general result that, assuming factivity plus
uniqueness, the answerability condition and the existence presupposition are inconsis-
tent. To show this, consider first the conjunction of factivity plus uniqueness in (24)
and the existence presupposition in (25). If in every context set world the question
extension contains at most one proposition with a true presupposition (factivity plus
uniqueness) and contains at least one proposition that is true (existence presupposi-
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tion), then in every context set world, the proposition in the question extension with
a true presupposition is true.
(28) Consequence of the existence presupposition, given factivity plus uniqueness:
c ⊆ {w: [ιp. p∈Q(w) & w∈dom(p)](w)}
On the other hand, according to the answerability condition in (20), the question
extension in some context set world contains a proposition whose presupposition is
true in every context set world and which itself is informative in the context set.
In terms of the Hamblin/Karttunen semantics in (15), that proposition is S(x), for
some individual x, where the domain of S(x) is characterized by P(x). Since every
Hamblin answer equals S(y) for some individual y, factivity plus uniqueness in (23)
and the fact that P(x) holds in every context set world ensure that S(x) is the only
proposition with a true presupposition that can be in the question extension in any
context set world. Suppose now that it holds in every context set world that there is a
unique proposition in the question extension with a true presupposition and that that
proposition is true. This would require that the context set entails S(x), which would
imply that S(x) is not informative in the context set, hence that the answerability
condition is violated. We conclude, therefore, that it cannot be that in every context
set world, the unique proposition in the question extension with a true presupposition
is true. This conclusion is stated in (29).
(29) Consequence of the answerability condition, given factivity plus uniqueness:
c * {w: [ιp. p∈Q(w) & w∈dom(p)](w)}
The statements in (28) and (29) are, of course, contradictory. Under the conspir-
acy analysis, then, questions like (21) invoke the necessary violation of one of two
felicity conditions. If a context set satisfies such a question’s existence presupposi-
tion and also satisfies the presupposition of one of its possible semantic answers, it
is guaranteed to already entail a complete answer to the question, in violation of the
answerability condition. The question in a sense answers itself. It is this property
that the conspiracy analysis holds responsible for the unacceptability of factive island
questions.
We now turn to providing a piece of independent support for the conspiracy anal-
ysis of factive islands.
4 Independent motivation
The conspiracy analysis would receive compelling support from questions whose se-
mantic makeup is different from that of factive islands, but where a similar conflict
between felicity conditions can be argued to cause unacceptability. We will now report
on a case of this sort.
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It has been known since the work of Ross (1967) that certain determiner phrases
(DPs) are islands for wh-subextraction in question formation. In particular, English
DPs headed by demonstratives typically ban wh-subextraction. This island effect
is illustrated by (30), whose unacceptability is due to wh-subextraction from a DP
headed by the demonstrative determiner that.
(30) *Which team did they arrest that violent fan of?
Simonenko (2016) proposes that the property of demonstrative DPs that prevents wh-
phrases to subextract from them is that they are directly referential in the sense of
Kaplan (1989). Accepting this generalization, we will therefore refer to this constraint
on wh-question formation as the referential island effect.3
Simonenko (2016) offers an account of the referential island effect that effectively
amounts to the conspiracy analysis of factive islands. Since this is not obvious from
cursory inspection of Simonenko’s rendition, we will recast the analysis in the for-
mat introduced above. In addition, we will simplify Simonenko’s account slightly,
sidestepping details that distract from the main point.
In virtue of a demonstrative DP being directly referential, it picks out a fixed, con-
textually determined individual as its denotation. The denotation of a demonstrative
DP therefore cannot vary with the interpretation of a variable that it might contain.
For the question in (30), this implies that the denotation of the demonstrative DP
that violent fan of is a fixed individual, which here we call r, and that its denotation
is accordingly independent of the semantic value of the wh-trace in the complement
position of of. With this in mind, consider again the Hamblin/Karttunen semantics
stated in (11), repeated in (31). Under the relevant semantics of the demonstrative,




(32) R = λx.λw. x is a team in w
S = λx.λw. they arrested r in w
(33) λw.{λv. they arrested r in v | x is a team in w}
Note now that the property S in (32) is a constant function. It maps any input
individual to the same proposition, viz. the proposition that they arrested r. That
proposition, call it p, is therefore the only possible member of the question extension in
3In those contexts where demonstratives have been argued to demonstrate quantificational be-
haviour (e.g., King 2001), Simonenko (2014) shows that they allow for wh-subextraction, confirming
the role of direct referentiality in the phenomenon.
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any possible world. In possible worlds where there is at least one team, the question
extension will be {p}; in worlds where no team exists, the question extension is
the empty set ∅. This entails that relative to any context set, the extension of the
question is rigid in the sense stated in (34): there is at most one proposition that
serves a member of the question extension’s in any context set world.
(34) Extension rigidity:
|{p: ∃w[w∈c & p∈Q(w)}| ≤ 1
We can now show that, given extension rigidity, the answerability condition is
inconsistent with the existence presupposition. This pair of felicity conditions, em-
ployed above in our rendition of the conspiracy analysis, is shown again in (35) and
(36), repeated from (20) and (25) above.
(35) Answerability condition (expanded):
cQ only if ∃p[ ∃w[w∈c & p∈Q(w)] & c⊆dom(p) & c*p]
(36) Existence presupposition:
cQ only if c ⊆ {w: ∃p[p∈Q(w) & p(w)]}
On the one hand, if there is at most one proposition that is a member of any question
extension in the context set (extension rigidity) and in every context set world there
is a proposition in the question extension that is true (existence presupposition), then
in every context world, the proposition that is a member of a question extension in
the context set is true. This consequence is stated in (37).
(37) Consequence of the existence presupposition, given extension rigidity:
c ⊆ ιp.∃w[w∈c & p∈Q(w)]
On the other hand, if there is at most one proposition that is a member of any
question extension in the context set (extension rigidity) and in some context set
world there is a proposition in the question extension that the context set does not
entail (answerability condition), then in some context set world, the proposition that
is a member of a question extension in the context set is false. This consequence is
stated in (38).
(38) Consequence of the answerability condition, given extension rigidity:
c * ιp.∃w[w∈c & p∈Q(w)]
What we have established is that, given the inconsistency of the consequences in
(37) and (38), extension rigidity guarantees that referential island questions necessar-
ily violate either the existence presupposition or the answerability condition.
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As announced, this analysis of referential islands closely parallels the conspiracy
analysis of factive islands. Both analyses derive the unacceptability of the relevant
questions from a conflict between the existence presupposition and the answerability
condition, given the question’s particular semantic makeup. In the case of factive
islands, this makeup is assumed to guarantee factivity plus uniqueness, while in the
case of referential islands it is assumed to guarantee question rigidity.
We are not aware of credible alternatives to the analysis of referential islands
presented here. In the absence of such alternatives, referential islands provide what
we consider compelling independent evidence for the conspiracy analysis of factive
islands.
That said, we have of course not established that the conspiracy analysis is the
only feasible approach to factive islands. We will now discuss an alternative approach,
due to Abrusa´n (2011, 2014).
5 Factive islands from propositional triviality?
On the conspiracy analysis, factive islandhood is due to conflicting felicity conditions,
and is not tied to trivial propositional content. As regards propositional content, the
analysis only commits to wh-questions carrying an existence presupposition, which
in the relevant factive island cases is a contingent proposition.
However, we have not presented an argument that factive island questions do not
carry trivial propositional content. In fact, Abrusa´n (2011, 2014) argued that they
do, and proposed that this is what causes their unacceptability. Abrusa´n builds an
analysis of factive islandhood on the observation (previously reported in Schlenker
2008, 2009), that in wh-questions, presuppositions triggered in the wh-phrase’s scope
tend to project universally. Abrusa´n illustrates this observation with the example in
(39), reporting that it presupposes that Bill invited each of these ten people.
(39) Who among these ten people does Mary regret that Bill invited?
This universal presupposition is contradictory in cases where the presupposition prop-
erty applies uniquely, as it does in (21), repeated again in (40).
(40) *Which of the girls does Fred know is the tallest member of our team?
Assuming universal projection, (40) presupposes that each girl is the tallest of our
team. Abrusa´n proposes to attribute factive islandhood to the contradictoriness of
such universal presuppositions. Abrusa´n extends this analysis to factive islands with
degree questions and how -questions, making suitable assumptions about their do-
mains to ensure that universal projection yields a contradictory presupposition. This
analysis, call it the projection analysis, is also endorsed (and refined) in Del Pinal
(2017).
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A problem with this analysis that we would like to draw attention to is that,
without further additions, it overgenerates factive island effects.4 Specifically, it in-
correctly leads one to expect that the effect carries over to declaratives. Starting
with Heim (1983), presuppositions have been proposed to project universally from
under certain quantifiers. Chemla (2009) reports, in particular, that presuppositions
reliably project universally from under quantifiers headed by the determiner no. For
example, Chemla observes that (41), where his is to be read as bound by none of
these ten students, presupposes that the father of each of these ten students is going
to receive a congratulation letter.
(41) None of these ten students knows that his father is going to receive a con-
gratulation letter.
With this in mind, consider the declarative sentence in (42), where again the personal
pronoun is to be read as bound by the subject quantifier. This example is predicted to
carry the very same universal presupposition as the one that the projection analysis
posits for the factive island in (40), viz. that each girl is the tallest member of our
team.
(42) None of the girls knows that she is the tallest member of our team.
Speaker intuitions in fact bear out this prediction. This presupposition being con-
tradictory, the example is accordingly perceived as pragmatically deficient. But it is
uncontroversial that this perceived deficiency does not amount to the sort of unac-
ceptability that factive islands give rise to. This observation requires an explanation
under any account that posits triviality, propositional or not, as a possible cause of
unacceptability. The particular challenge under the projection analysis, however, is to
find an explanation for the relevant contrast between questions and declaratives. Why
would a universally projected contradictory presupposition cause unacceptability in
questions when it fails to do so in declaratives?5
In the absence of a compelling answer to this question, we conclude that the
expected presence of a contradictory universally projected presuppositions does not
4There is also a potential problem of undergeneration, arising from the observation in Schwarz
and Simonenko (2018a) that universal projection in wh-questions is fragile, in the sense that it can
be suspended under certain contextual conditions. Here we focus on overgeneration.
5A reviewer suggests that the acceptability of (42) is not representative, in that it is tied to the
particular properties of the superlative construction featured in the embedded clause; the reviewer
also proposes a different rationale for the contrast between (40) and (42). As far as we can see,
however, the relevant judgments do not depend on the particulars of how uniqueness in the embedded
clause is linguistically established. For example, the sentence No woman regrets that you got this
letter from her, in a reading where no woman binds her, is as acceptable as (42) and again contrasts
with corresponding factive island cases, such as Szabolcsi and Zwarts’s (1993) example (6a) above
(*From whom do you regret having gotten this letter? ).
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provide a satisfactory rationale for factive islandhood. We maintain that the conspir-
acy analysis is needed, entailing that meaning-driven unacceptability can arise in the
absence of trivial propositional content.6,7
In Section 6, we return to the conspiracy analysis, showing that it is in need of
refinement, in particular noting that the notion of triviality the analysis refers to
cannot be logical triviality.
6 Not just logical triviality
We have so far equated necessary infelicity of a sentence with the absence of any
logically possible context set relative to which the sentence is felicitous. However,
this sense of necessary infelicity undergenerates factive islands. To illustrate, let us
compare our running example (21), repeated again in (43), to Szabolcsi and Zwarts’
(1993) example (7), repeated again in (44a), and Oshima’s (2007) example (44b).
(43) *Which of the girls does Fred know is the tallest member of our team?
(44) a. *From whom do you regret having gotten this letter?
b. *Who does Max know that Alice got married to on June 1st?
6The projection analysis also differs from the conspiracy analysis with regard to the predicted
logical signature of factive islands. This is because it is logically possible for universal projection to
yield a contradiction even if the presupposition property does not apply uniquely. The example in
(i) is a possible test case.
(i) ?Which of these four girls does Fred know finished in the top three?
The sentence is expected to carry the contradictory presupposition that each of the four girls finished
in the top three. Unlike the conspiracy analysis, therefore, the projection analysis predicts (i) to
be a factive island. What we have found is that most speakers judge examples like (i) to be more
easily interpretable than familiar factive island cases. Those speakers in particular do not judge (i)
to be contradictory. Given this judgment, the projection analysis faces the challenge of allowing for
the absence of contradiction in cases like (i) without making the unwanted prediction that factive
islandhood is always obviated. The approach that may seem most promising hypothesizes that in
(i) the absence of contradiction is due to tacit restriction of the wh-restrictor’s domain to those girls
who finished in the top three. In factive islands, the corresponding restriction would be blocked
pragmatically, on the grounds of reducing the wh-restrictor to a singleton (Schwarz and Simonenko
2018b). This hypothesis, however, must be reconciled with the finding that tacit domain restriction
is otherwise hard or impossible with restrictors of the particular form in (i), featuring a partitive
with a numeral and a complex demonstrative (Chemla 2009, Geurts and van Tiel 2015).
7The conclusion that unacceptability can be driven by non-propositional triviality has conse-
quences for the nature of the “deductive system” posited in Fox and Hackl (2006), a module of
grammar assumed to calculate triviality for the purposes of meaning-driven unacceptability. The
conspiracy analysis of factive islands entails that the deductive system must have access to felicity
conditions and must calculate triviality with reference to those conditions.
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When deriving the necessary infelicity of (44a) in Section 3.2, we assumed that it is
logically necessary for the presupposition property to apply uniquely. This assump-
tion was justified, as it is not logically possible for two different individuals to be
the tallest member of our team. However, the corresponding assumption is hard or
impossible to defend for the examples in (44). It is unclear to us whether it is logi-
cally necessary for this letter to have at most one sender, and (as Oshima’s discussion
makes clear) it is evidently not logically necessary for Alice to have married at most
one person on June 1st.
That said, letters by default are taken to have a unique sender, and (as Oshima
notes) by default no one is taken to marry more than once on the same day. Let
us say that contexts that are compatible with letters having multiple senders and
with multiple marriages by the same person on the same day are not accessible. To
accommodate examples like those in (44), we can then suitable weaken the condition
on unacceptability assumed under the conspiracy analysis. The requirement that a
given sentence be infelicitous in all logically possible context sets is now weakened to
the requirement that it be infelicitous in all accessible context sets. So amended, the
conspiracy analysis does not merely exclude cases like (43) that suffer from logical
triviality, but also cases like those in (44) that suffer from mere relative triviality
– triviality that holds relative to certain entrenched, though logically contingent,
background assumptions.
The finding that unacceptability can arise from mere relative, non-logical, triv-
iality is in conflict with established thinking about the general characteristics of
meaning-driven unacceptability. For concreteness, let us return to the definiteness
effect and Barwise and Cooper’s (1981) proposal that examples like (1), repeated in
(45), are unacceptable in virtue of having tautological truth conditions.
(45) *There is every student.
This proposal invited the objection that logically trivial truth conditions do not al-
ways lead to unacceptability, as illustrated by the unquestionable acceptability of
tautologous statements like (46) (e.g., Keenan 1987, Heim 1991).
(46) Every student is either invited or not invited.
Aiming to preserve the idea that meaning-driven unacceptability has to do with mean-
ing triviality, more recent literature therefore took on the task of pinpointing the
precise conditions under which logical triviality results in unacceptability (Gajewski
2002, Chierchia 2013, Abrusa´n 2014, Del Pinal 2017). Gajewski (2002) introduced
the influential idea that a logical triviality is unacceptable only if the triviality is
guaranteed by the sentence’s so-called logical skeleton, that is, if it is preserved un-
der arbitrary substitutions of the non-logical vocabulary it contains. This proposal
discriminates between the examples in (45) and (46) because There is every P is
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tautologous regardless of the content of P, whereas Every student is either P or not
Q is a tautology under only some possible contents of P and Q. Abrusa´n (2014) and
Del Pinal (2017) explore variants of this proposal, which applies to examples like (45)
and (46) in much the same way.
By presupposing that only logical triviality can ever give rise to unacceptability,
these proposals fail to exclude as unacceptable any statements that are not logical
trivialities in the first place. For example, alongside logical trivialities like (46), they
allow for the acceptability of logically contingent statements like No cats are dogs or
Some cats are dogs, notwithstanding the fact that in any ordinary contexts, those are
invariably judged true and false, respectively. By the same token, the unacceptability
of factive island examples like those in (44), where uniqueness is given by non-logical
content, is not within the reach of these proposals, and that would continue to be the
case even if the proposals were extended to also recognize non-propositional triviality
as a possible cause of unacceptability.8,9
In short, to the extent that factive islands are to be captured under a unified theory
of meaning-driven unacceptability, such a theory must renounce the assumption that
only logical triviality can give rise to unacceptability. We must leave to future work
the task of devising a unified theory of meaning-driven unacceptability that abandons
this premise. Here we content ourselves with identifying a possible starting point,
provided by remarks in Chierchia (2013, 53). Chierchia speculates that trivial content
results in unacceptability in cases where the compositional history of the triviality
is “not readily accessible to conscious introspection”. Chierchia accordingly suggests
that listeners can use introspection to detect triviality in examples like (46), but not
in examples like (45). Building on Chierchia’s speculation, we suggest that a triviality
might be inaccessible to introspection even if it is not a logical triviality, and that
this possibility can be instantiated by factive islands.
We leave further development of this line of thought for another occasion. But we
would like to point to a particular type of empirical issue that Chierchia’s speculation
might help address. It is not hard to see that the conspiracy analysis as articulated
8The finding is in particular incompatible with Fox and Hackl’s (2006) proposal that triviality
is calculated by an encapsulated “deductive system” (see footnote 7). The deductive system is a
hypothesized module of grammar that does not have access to grammar-external information, such
as as listener’s background assumptions.
9Applying the projection analysis outlined in Section 5, Abrusa´n (2014) and Del Pinal (2017)
too argue that factive islands resist Gajewski’s (2002) characterization of meaning-driven unaccept-
ability. Their argument does not make reference to the content of the embedded clause, though,
but instead focuses on the factive embedding predicate. They point out that, given that the fac-
tive embedder is presumably not part of a sentence’s logical skeleton, and given that triviality is
dependent on factivity, the logical skeleton of a factive island question does not guarantee trivial-
ity. Both authors propose variants of Gajewski’s (2002) account that they argue circumvents this
problem. However, these proposals do not address the issue that we have focused on here, viz. the
problem that factive islandhood in who-questions can arise even if uniqueness is not established by
a sentence’s logical content, so that triviality is not logical in the first place.
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so far overgenerates unacceptability in the realm of wh-questions. The issue we have
in mind is illustrated by the acceptability of the wh-question in (47).
(47) Who is invited or not invited?
The scope property of (47) maps every person x to the tautologous Hamblin answer
that x is invited or is not invited. This entails that it is impossible for (47) to
satisfy the answerability condition spelled out in Section 3.2. Under the unembellished
conspiracy analysis, therefore, (47) is excluded as unacceptable. This is, however,
incorrect. While perhaps pragmatically deficient, (47) is clearly not unacceptable.
Examples like (47) differ from factive islands in how the necessary infelicity arises.
While (47) necessarily violates a particular felicity condition, the necessary infelicity
of questions with factive islands (or referential islands) depends on a conspiracy of two
felicity conditions, viz. the answerability condition and the existence presupposition.
That is, while it is not possible for such a question to satisfy both felicity conditions
at the same time, there are possible worlds where it satisfies one or the other. A
hypothesis that inspired the name “conspiracy analysis” is that necessary infelicity
yields unacceptability only if it is due to such a conspiracy of felicity conditions. We
suggest that Chierchia’s speculation offers a possible rationale for this generalization,
as a triviality may be more easily detectable by conscious introspection when this
triviality is due to a single felicity condition than when it arises from a conspiracy of
felicity conditions. We leave further exploration of this speculation for future work.
In Section 7, we return to the phenomenon of factive islands proper, to investigate
whether the conspiracy analysis has adequate effects beyond the domain of who-
questions.
7 Back to the logical signature
In this final section we further probe the empirical adequacy of the conspiracy anal-
ysis of factive islands. The conspiracy analysis derives necessary infelicity under the
assumption that the gapped complement of the factive embedding predicate applies
uniquely. While this assumption has the intended effect for who-questions, its ade-
quacy for the analysis of other cases of factive islands remains to be examined. We
saw that factive islands are attested with how - and why-questions, such as Oshima’s
(2007) examples in (9), repeated in (48).
(48) a. *?How does Max know that Alice went to San Francisco?
b. *Why does Max know that Alice insulted Pat?
Abrusa´n (2011) moreover reports that degree questions, too, can give rise to factive
islands. Abrusa´n illustrates this with the example in (49), where the degree wh-
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phrase how has extracted from the complement factive regret (accompanied by the
pied-piped gradable predicate tall).
(49) *How tall do you regret that you are?
We will assume that such questions have much the same structure as who-questions,
but instead of properties of individuals, involve properties of manners, reasons, or de-
grees (e.g., Higginbotham 1993, Beck and Rullmann 1999). The question is then
whether these instances of the factive island effect share the logical signature of who-
questions of the sort analyzed above, hence whether they also fall under the purview
of the conspiracy analysis. This is the question to be addressed in the remainder of
this section. We discuss degree questions (Sect. 7.1), how -questions (Sect. 7.2), and
why-questions (Sect. 7.3), in this order.
7.1 Degree questions
The conspiracy analysis will have the intended effect for the degree question in (49),
repeated in (50), if it is assigned the semantics in (51). According to this semantics,
the presupposition property only holds of a unique degree, viz. your actual height,
instantiating the requisite logical signature.
(50) *How tall do you regret that you are?
(51) R = λd.λw. d is a height
P = λd.λw. your height in w = d
S = λd.λw: your height in w = d. you regret in w that your height = d
However, the “exactly” semantics in (51) is not the only option to be considered.
Under a commonly held view (e.g., Beck and Rullmann 1999, Fox and Hackl 2006),
degree questions have an “at least” semantics, and the meaning of (49) would be
given by (52) instead of (51).
(52) R = λd.λw. d is a height
P = λd.λw. your height in w ≥ d
S = λd.λw: your height in w ≥ d. you regret in w that your height ≥ d
The presupposition property in (52) does not hold of a unique degree. In addition
to your actual height, it also maps any degree below your actual height to a true
proposition. Under the “at least” semantics, the degree question in (50) therefore
lacks the uniqueness property, hence lacks the logical signature that the conspiracy
analysis relies on to exclude questions as necessarily infelicitous.
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Are there independent reasons for preferring the question semantics in (51) to the
one in (52)? One piece of support for an “exactly” semantics for degree questions
comes from an observation in Spector (2018) about the truth conditions of examples
like (53), where a degree question is embedded under know.
(53) Ann knows how tall Ben is.
Spector’s observation, applied to the case at hand, is that (53) unambiguously has a
strongly exhaustive reading in the sense of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), entailing
that Ann knows Ben’s exact height. As Spector also notes, this observation can be
interpreted as supporting an “exactly” semantics for the embedded degree question,
stated in (54a), as opposed to the “at least” semantics stated in (54b).
(54) a. R = λd.λw. d is a height
S = λd.λw. Ben’s height in w = d
b. R = λd.λw. d is a height
S = λd.λw. Ben’s height in w ≥ d
The reason is that under independently motivated assumptions about question em-
bedding (based on data from embedded who-questions) only (54a) can explain why
(53) can only have a strongly exhaustive reading (Klinedinst and Rothschild 2011, Ue-
gaki 2015, Spector and Egre´ 2015, Cremers and Chemla 2016, Cremers 2016, Theiler
et al. 2016, Xiang 2016). Under the question meaning in (54b), (53) is incorrectly
predicted to allow for a weaker reading, an intermediate exhaustive reading in the
sense of Klinedinst and Rothschild (2011), which can be true even if Ann fails to
know Ben’s exact height, viz. if she considers it possible that Ben is taller than he
actually is.10
How can an “exactly” semantics like (54a) be made to arise compositionally?
A straightforward answer would assume that degree predicates themselves have an
“exactly” semantics. Assuming that degree predicates relate individuals to degrees
(Cresswell 1976), the lexical entry for tall would then be as in (56).
(56) J tall K = λd. λx. λw. x’s height in w = d
10 To confirm that (53) indeed does not allow for such a weaker, intermediate exhaustive reading,
we note that (53) cannot be judged true in scenario (55), which is modelled after a parallel scenario
provided in Spector (2018).
(55) Ann has learned that Ben was selected to play for the team Beaconsfield Baskets. Ann
is not sure about Ben’s exact height, but since she knows that the Beaconsfield Baskets
strictly require players to be at least 180 cm tall, she comes to believe that Ben is no shorter
than 180 cm. As it happens, Ben is exactly 180 cm tall.
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However, presenting the example in (57), Abrusa´n (2007) shows such an analysis to
be inadequate. If tall had the lexical entry in (56), any Hamblin answer to (57) would
convey, for some height d, that you are required to be exactly d tall to be a basketball
player. As a consequence, the question should carry the existence presupposition that
there is some height d such that you are required to be exactly d tall.
(57) How tall are you required to be to be a basketball player?
This is, however, not how the question has to be understood. Instead, (57) is naturally
interpreted as merely presupposing that there is a minimum height that you are
required to have to be a basketball player, without imposing an upper bound on the
range of permissible heights.
Fortunately, recent work on the semantics of degree and numerals points to a way
of deriving “exactly” meanings for degree questions that accommodates examples
like (57) (Heim 2006, Kennedy 2015, Buccola and Spector 2016, Gentile and Schwarz
2018). Gradable predicates are assigned an “at least” semantics like (58a) but are
assumed to be accompanied in logical form by a maximality operator, here called Π,
with the semantics in (58b) (where max is taken to map a set of degrees to its greatest
member).
(58) a. J tall K = λd. λx. λw. x’s height in w ≥ d
b. JΠ K = λd. λP. λw. max{d’: P(d’)(w)} = d
Suppose Π combines with how to form a phrase that originates in the gradable pred-
icate’s degree argument position, from where it moves covertly for interpretability.
Suppose further that how subextracts from the Π-phrase by way of wh-movement.
This leads to the logical form in (59a), which delivers the intended “exactly” meaning
in (54a). Further, the intended meaning for example (57) can now be attributed to
the logical form in (59b), where the Π-phrase is taking inverse scope over the modal
required.
(59) a. how λd[ [Π d] λd’[Ben d’ tall] ]
b. how λd[ [Π d] λd’[required [you d’ tall] ] ]
We conclude, therefore, that examples like (57), while providing evidence against
an “exactly” semantics for gradable predicates, are compatible with an “exactly”
semantics for degree questions like the embedded question in (53).
The proposed analysis furthermore delivers the intended “exactly” meaning (51)
for the factive island question (49). This meaning is the interpretation of the logical
form in (60), where the Π-phrase takes scope within the complement of regret.
(60) how λd[you regret [Π d] λd’ [you are d’ tall] ]
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Suppose now that the complement clause of a factive predicate is in fact a scope island
for the Π-phrase, perhaps as an instance of the stringent constraints on the scope of
degree operators described in Heim (2000). In that case, (60) is the only available
logical form for (49), hence (51) is the only derivable interpretation of (49). Under
the conspiracy analysis, (49) is then correctly excluded. We conclude, therefore, that
factive islandhood in degree questions is compatible with the conspiracy analysis.
7.2 How-questions
We have seen that the factive island effect is found with how -questions. This is
illustrated again by the unacceptability of (61) in a reading where how is understood
as originating in the embedded clause.
(61) *How does she know that he opened that coconut?
Do such questions also have the logical signature required under the conspiracy
analysis, that is, does the presupposition property in those cases necessarily apply to
a unique member of the restrictor extension?
As Oshima (2007) and Abrusa´n (2011, 2014) note, this issue can be investigated
by considering simple how -questions such as (62). Suppose it can be shown that (62)
cannot have more than one true Hamblin answer. This would indicate that the scope
property of (62) applies uniquely, and thereby show indirectly that the same must be
true of the presupposition property in the factive island case (61).
(62) How did he open that coconut?
While Oshima (2007) suggested that simple how -questions like (62) indeed (tend
to) allow for at most one true Hamblin answer, Abrusa´n (2011, 2014) argues that this
claim is incompatible with the range of felicitous responses that such questions rou-
tinely permit. To illustrate, (63) can serve as a felicitous response to (62), seemingly
spelling out two Hamblin answers to (62), viz. the proposition that he opened the
coconut slowly and the proposition that he opened it carefully.
(63) Slowly and carefully.
However, we think that it is actually unclear whether (63) spells out two Hamblin
answers, as opposed to just one, viz. the proposition that he opened the coconut
slowly and carefully. Given that the set of ways that a how -question is about seems
context dependent (cf. Oshima 2007, Sæbø 2016) we are not sure how the latter
possibility can be excluded. More generally, it seems to us that the uncertainty
about the mapping from linguistic responses to Hamblin answers makes it difficult to
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draw reliable conclusions about a question’s semantics based on the possible linguistic
responses it can receive.
To circumvent this source of uncertainty, we therefore propose a more direct di-
agnostic for the logical makeup of a question, viz. additive else as a modifier of the
wh-phrase. Schwarz (In press) observes that the contribution of additive else in a
question like Who else called? is twofold. First, else introduces the additive presup-
position that the scope property holds of some salient entity, the additive referent.
In the case at hand, the additive presupposition is the proposition that the additive
referent called. Second, else subtracts the additive referent from the restrictor’s ex-
tension, thereby excluding Hamblin answers about the additive referent. As Schwarz
also notes, this predicts correctly the oddness of else in cases where the scope property
applies uniquely. For example, (64) is expectedly odd, since the additive presuppo-
sition, the proposition that the additive referent is the tallest member of our team,
is in conflict with the question’s existence presupposition, viz. the proposition that
someone other than the additive referent is the tallest member.11
(64) #Who else is the tallest member of our team?
We now observe that adding else to the acceptable question in (62), as in (65),
renders the example odd in much the way (64) is. Based on this observation, we
conclude that in the case of (62), the scope property indeed applies uniquely. Ac-
cordingly, we conclude the same holds true for the presupposition property in (61),
hence that this particular example indeed has the logical signature required for the
conspiracy analysis to correctly exclude it as necessarily infelicitous.12
(65) #How else did he open that coconut?
We do not wish to claim, however, that all how -questions have a scope property
that applies uniquely. What the conspiracy analysis leads us to hypothesize is merely
that there is a correlation between attested factive islandhood and the infelicity of
else in the wh-phrase of the corresponding simple question. As far as we can see, the
data are consistent with this hypothesis. For example, the infelicitous else example in
11On this analysis, the oddness of wh else-questions like (64) is another instance of necessary
infelicity. The triviality is propositional, due to a contradictory presupposition. The contradiction
arises from conspiring felicity conditions (on the use of additive else and wh-questions), which in
Section 6 we speculated is a sufficient condition for unacceptability. We are not sure, however, about
our intuitions regarding the nature of the oddness of examples like (64), hence whether such cases
are actually judged to instantiate meaning-driven unacceptability.
12 In Schwarz and Simonenko (In press), we lay out the space of possibilities regarding the source
of the uniqueness effect exemplified by how else-questions like (65), as well as certain why else-
questions (to be discussed in Sect. 7.3 below). There we also spell out in more detail the argument
that evidence from linguistic responses is insufficient, and we begin to relate the evidence from wh
else to proposals in previous literature regarding semantic typologies of how - and why-questions.
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(65) can be rescued by adding the possibility modal could in the wh-phrase’s scope.
The question in (66) is fully acceptable.
(66) How else could he have opened that coconut?
Apparently, the possibility modal obviates uniqueness. This is in fact expected, since
even if there is a unique way in which he opened that coconut, there plausibly can be
multiple ways in which he could have opened it. Under the conspiracy analysis, we
therefore expect that the addition of could, as in (67), likewise ameliorates (61). As
indicated, this prediction appears to be correct.13
(67) ?How does she know that he could have opened that coconut?
There are other types of how -questions where the scope property systematically
fails to have the uniqueness property. These include question where how functions
as an adjective. The felicity of the how else-question (68a), where the wh-phrase
originates in the complement position of feel, serves to illustrate this. Once again,
the judgment on factive islands tracks the judgment on how else questions, as (68b)
is acceptable, at least more so than classic factive island cases like (61).
(68) a. How else is this making you feel?
b. ?How does she know this is making you feel?
We conclude that, as far as we can determine, data from how -questions, too, are
consistent with the conspiracy analysis of factive islands.
7.3 Why-questions
Does factive islandhood in why-questions also coincide with the presupposition prop-
erty applying uniquely, as expected under the conspiracy analysis? Oshima (2007)
argues that that is the case. Here we will investigate the issue by employing the else
diagnostic introduced in the last subsection, which will lead us to qualify Oshima’s
assessment.
13Abrusa´n (2011, 2014) presents example (i) below, noting that “for most speakers, factive islands
. . . can be significantly ameliorated by placing an existential modal in the scope of a factive verb”.
(i) ?How do you regret that John was allowed to behave?
Aligned with Abrusa´n’s comment, we have also found that speakers vary in their judgments about
such examples and that they are generally judged to be less than perfect. We must leave these
qualifications as an open problem (for the conspiracy analysis and also Abrusa´n’s own analysis,
reviewed in Section 5 below).
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We begin with the pair of examples in (69). (69a) exhibits the factive island effect
under the reading where why is taken to modify the embedded clause. The infelicity
of (69b) indicates that there the scope property applies uniquely, and hence that
the presupposition property in (69a) does, too. We conclude, then, that (69a) has
the logical signature required under the conspiracy analysis, which excludes (69a) as
necessarily infelicitous.14
(69) a. *Why does she know that your light went out at midnight?
b. #Why else did your light go out at midnight?
As in the case of how -questions, though, we do not wish to claim that all why-
questions have the uniqueness property. Once again, the addition of a possibility
modal systematically obviates uniqueness and expectedly renders else acceptable.
This is illustrated by (70a). (70b) is another felicitous why else-question. We are
not sure about what exactly accounts for the contrast between (70b) and (69b). One
might speculate that, unlike reasons for certain physical events, the reasons for mental
states need not be unique, but we will leave a closer investigation of this issue for
future work.15
(70) a. Why else could your light have gone out at midnight?
b. Why else are you angry?
The point we wish to focus on here is that, surprisingly, in the case of why-
questions, the else diagnostic and factive islandhood are not aligned. That is, despite
the absence of uniqueness, the examples in (71) do not seem to be significantly more
acceptable, in the relevant readings, than the factive island example in (69a).
(71) a. *Why does she know that your light could have gone out at midnight?
b. *Why does she know that you are angry?
14Our observation about (69b) is reminiscent of data presented in Unger (1977) to argue for the
“uniqueness of causation”. Unger reported, for example, that Bill’s sneezing caused Betty to catch a
cold for the second time, and so did something else is inconsistent, viz. on the grounds of portraying
two different events as the cause of Betty’s catching a cold for the second time. Oshima (2007)
presents a similar data point, one that also suggests that reasons are, in certain cases, understood
to be unique. Oshima reports that Alice insulted Max because she was on edge, among other reasons
cannot be interpreted as conveying that Alice insulted Max because she was on edge, and that Alice
insulted Max because of some other reasons. That is, according to Oshima, the because-clause and
among other reasons must be interpreted as jointly specifying a single reason for Alice’s insulting
Max, apparently because the possibility of the insult having multiple reasons is excluded.
15Christine Bartels (personal communication) observes that Why else was this year’s harvest
below average? is acceptable, suggesting that it is not just mental states that allow for multiple
reasons.
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These examples not being excluded by the conspiracy analysis, we are led to con-
clude that they are unacceptable for independent reasons. While we cannot further
identify these independent reasons, we note that why-questions have been said to
be exceptional in other respects. Investigating so-called negative islands, Fox (2007)
observes that why-questions resist extraction past negation under a broader range of
circumstances than degree questions and how -questions. More generally, Szabolcsi
and Zwarts (1993, fn. 14) report that “[the] extraction [of why ] is blocked by a wider
range of interveners than that of any other wh-phrase”.16
While this issue requires further study, we will content ourselves in this paper
with the conclusion that why-questions are compatible with the conspiracy analysis
of factive islands.
8 Conclusions
Elaborating on a proposal in Oshima (2007), we have made a case that the unaccept-
ability of factive islands is not propositional and does not need to be logical. This
analysis requires a revision of the prevalent view about meaning-driven unacceptabil-
ity, according to which the triviality that results in unacceptability is both proposi-
tional and logical (Gajewski 2002, Fox and Hackl 2006, Chierchia 2013, Abrusa´n 2014,
Del Pinal 2017). Our findings lead us to a four-way typology of possible meaning-
driven unacceptability, as indicated in the table in (72).
(72)
logical relative
propositional various phenomena ?
non-propositional referential islands factive islands
If the literature is correct about at least some of the relevant phenomena, the propo-
sitional and logical type is instantiated in language (e.g., Barwise and Cooper 1981,
Dowty 1979, von Fintel 1993, Krifka 1995, Lahiri 1998, Chierchia 2013, Gajewski
2009). We have argued that the triviality of factive islands is neither propositional
nor necessarily logical. We can add that the triviality of referential islands, according
to the analysis reviewed in Section 4, is non-propositional but logical. The ques-
tion mark in the top right cell indicates that we are not aware of an instance of the
propositional and relative type, that is, meaning-driven unacceptability that stems
from propositional triviality that need not be logical. The absence of cases of this
type, if confirmed, would present an important observation for a general theory of
meaning-driven unacceptability to explain.
16Szabolcsi and Zwarts note, for example, that Why did you want me to quit? cannot be in-
terpreted as asking about the reason the addressee wanted the speaker to have for quitting. The
contrast with our example (4b) (Why does Max think that Alice insulted Pat? ), where the corre-
sponding reading seems available, suggests that the possibility of extracting why from a clausal
complement is restricted to complements of bridge verbs like think.
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